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INTRODUCTION 
The AMR bankruptcy, merger, and antitrust suit depict the story of 
a legacy airline seeking rescue from financial disaster by agreeing to 
merge with U.S. Airways, only to be surprised by the Department of 
Justice Antitrust Division’s lawsuit. In November 2011, the parent 
company of American Airlines, AMR, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.1 
AMR was one of the last of the legacy U.S. airline carriers to file for 
bankruptcy.2 Legacy airlines include those that were founded earlier and 
traditionally known to provide better service (like free baggage and in-
flight catering).3 AMR suffered overwhelming cumulative losses of $10 
billion since 2001,4 annual union costs of $600 million more than those 
of its rivals,5 and fierce competition from consolidated legacy-airline 
sharks that swam in its increasingly red ocean6. 
Miraculously, in February 2013, AMR found a haven from the 
uncertainty of Chapter 11 through the opportunity to merge with U.S. 
Airways, a slightly smaller provider of domestic flights.7 Doug Parker, 
U.S. Airways’ CEO, stated that the opportunity for a merger developed 
two years earlier, when AMR filed for bankruptcy.8 He said it was a 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Dominic Rushe, American Airlines Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Protection, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/business/ 
2011/nov/29/american-airlines-chapter-11-bankruptcy. 
 2. Id. 
 3. C.S., Legacy vs Low-Cost Carriers: Spot the Difference, THE ECONOMIST, 
March 26, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2013/03/legacy-vs-low-
cost-carriers. 
 4. See Frank Voisin, Staggering chart shows the decade of losses at American 
Airlines (AMR, AER), SMARTER INVESTING BY COVESTOR (Aug. 2, 2011), 
http://investing.covestor.com/2011/08/staggering-chart-shows-the-decade-of-losses-at-
american-airlines-amr-aer. 
 5. Rushe, supra note 1. 
 6. Susan Carey, Brent Kendall & Jack Nicas, U.S. Moves to Block US Airways–
American Airlines Merger, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424127887324769704579010612415800106.html [hereinafter U.S. 
Moves to Block Merger]. 
 7. Susan Carey, U.S. Leaves American–US Airways Deal in a Lurch, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 18, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873234238045790207 
62369438156.html [hereinafter U.S. Leaves Deal in a Lurch]. 
 8. Susan Carey, US Airways Chief Describes Biggest Challenges in AMR 
Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304579404579232100811998912#printMode [hereinafter Biggest 
Challenges]. 
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logical partnership that would allow the new entity to be a contender 
against large legacy airlines, as opposed to the low-cost carriers.9 He did 
not see the bankruptcy as a large problem but rather as an advantage that 
would allow AMR to address its inflated operating expenses. 10  The 
opportunity allowed the companies to take advantage of each other’s 
best assets, and promised an additional $280 million each year in 
revenue.11 
The companies gave themselves until mid-December 2013 to 
finalize the proposed deal.12 They agreed to keep the American Airlines 
company name and the U.S. Airways CEO in office;13 it seemed as if 
everyone, including the employees’ and pilots’ unions, were pleased.14 
In August 2013, however, the parties were shocked to discover that 
their merger was the target of a Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust 
Division lawsuit.15 The suit threatened to disrupt AMR’s intentions to 
complete its bankruptcy proceedings quickly.16 A prompt resolution of 
the bankruptcy issue was an essential cornerstone for the merger, and 
therefore, American Airlines and U.S. Airlines were relying upon the 
government’s blessing to move forward.17 
The Antitrust Division’s intervention came about quite 
unexpectedly given the division’s history of offering rapid approval of a 
number of similar mergers.18 In recent years, the airline industry had 
become a red ocean because the level of competition made it difficult 
for legacy carriers to turn a profit.19 They were left with two options: 
merge with one another or reorganize in Chapter 11.20 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Steven Pearlstein, Why the Justice Department Blocked the American–US 
Airways Merger, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2013), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/15/why-the-justice-
department-blocked-the-american-us-airways-merger/. 
 12. U.S. Leaves Deal in a Lurch, supra note 7. 
 13. Id. 
 14. U.S. Moves to Block Merger, supra note 6. 
 15. Biggest Challenges, supra note 8. 
 16. U.S. Moves to Block Merger, supra note 6. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Pearlstein, supra note 11. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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The surprise move by the Antitrust Division culminated in a 
settlement in November 2013. 21  While the Antitrust Division has a 
reputation for not considering political factors when deciding whether to 
block corporate mergers,22 the American Airlines–U.S. Airways merger 
was different. In fact, politics seems to have played a significant role in 
its decision to settle the suit. 
This note will discuss Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the general 
independence of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and 
Federal Trade Commission as antitrust law enforcement agencies. 
Section II of this note will discuss why the Antitrust Division should 
have prosecuted the American Airlines–U.S. Airways merger on its 
antitrust merits, as well as the stand-alone theory and advantage pricing 
theory, both of which were strong incentives for pursuing the case at 
trial. Section III of this note will discuss three reasons why the Antitrust 
Division may have opted to settle this lawsuit, and will ultimately 
determine that a long-term settlement strategy and litigation risk fears 
were unlikely to be strong enough, but that political forces may have 
been the driver behind the lawsuit’s settlement. 
I. GENERAL APPLICATIONS OF § 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND THE 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST 
DIVISION AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
A. THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S COMPLAINT WAS BASED UPON A VIOLATION 
OF § 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT. 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act bans commercial activity when a 
company acquires another one, which causes a substantial decrease in 
competition or creates a monopoly.23 The antitrust merger doctrine aims 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Jad Mouawad, Merger of American and US Airways is Waved Ahead, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/28/business/airlines-clear-
final-merger-obstacle.html?ref=business&pagewanted=print. 
 22. See D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1055, 1112 (2010) (citing Malcolm B. Coate & Shaw W. Ulrick, 
Transparency at the Federal Trade Commission: The Horizontal Merger Review 
Process 1996-2003, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 531, 564 (2005)). 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012) (“No person engaged in commerce or in any activity 
affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the 
stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person 
engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of 
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to protect competition in a particular market or line of commerce.24 The 
Antitrust Division argued that an American Airlines–U.S. Airways 
merger would threaten competition in the domestic airline industry by 
leaving only four remaining major domestic airlines and exposing 
consumers to rising ticket prices.25 Therefore, if the Antitrust Division’s 
suit had been successful, it would have found a violation of Clayton Act 
Section 7.26 
B. IN THE PAST, THE GOVERNMENT’S ANTITRUST ENFORCERS HAD A 
REPUTATION FOR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE. 
While the DOJ is not traditionally considered an independent 
agency like the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”),27 its enforcement 
of antitrust laws through the Antitrust Division to guard the institutions 
of capitalism and freedom of opportunity28 is generally non-partisan.29 
Congress did not intend the antitrust statutes to give courts jurisdiction 
over social issues and theories, such as the efficiency of the economy or 
small business initiatives, but rather it intended to protect consumers and 
their right to fair treatment.30 
Since their formation, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade 
Commission have established guidelines to analyze horizontal 
                                                                                                                 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the 
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create 
a monopoly.”). 
 24. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963). 
 25. Complaint at 3, United States v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-01236 
(D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2013). 
 26. Id. at 7. 
 27. Sheila F. Anthony, Remarks at the Columbia University International 
Journalists Seminar (March 21, 2000), (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
public-statements/2000/03/remarks); see Marisa Taylor & Margaret Talev, Politics 
Weakens Justice Dept. Independence, MCCLATCHY DC (June. 18, 2007), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2007/06/18/17061/politics-weakens-justice-dept.html 
(showing evidence of the partisan nature of the Department of Justice). 
 28. Antitrust Division Mission, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/mission.html. 
 29. Bill Baer, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the New York State Bar 
Association (Jan. 30, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
speeches/303269.pdf). 
 30. Philip C. Kissam, Antitrust Boycott Doctrine, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1165, 1174 
(1984). 
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mergers.31 The guidelines describe what aspects of deals enforcement 
agencies should focus on to determine if the agency that opts to 
prosecute has grounds under antitrust law to do so.32 Of the aspects 
covered, the guidelines cover relevant market definition, measurement 
and concentration of the market, potential adverse competitive effects of 
the proposed merger, entry factors, efficiencies, and failing-company 
considerations. 33  Notably missing from the list of considerations are 
political factors.34 
The government has lived up to its apolitical calling, as an FTC 
study from 2006 examining the Bush Senior and Clinton 
administrations’ antitrust records found no differences in the standards 
antitrust officials used to enforce cases.35 This result emerged regardless 
of the officials’ political affiliation or of the party in control of the 
White House.36 This study by Malcolm Coate, a senior economist at the 
FTC’s Bureau of Economics,37 found that the “FTC merger policy has 
remained constant across both Republican and Democratic 
administrations over the past twenty years.”38 
This study was included in an article by Coate and Shawn W. 
Ulrick that was published in the Antitrust Law Journal.39 The article 
discussed transparency in the FTC enforcement of horizontal merger 
doctrine. 40  The study provided econometric analysis to pinpoint 
variables—such as market concentration, entry conditions, and viable 
customer concerns—which affected the differing enforcement of 
                                                                                                                 
 31. C. PAUL ROGERS III, STEPHEN CALKINS, MARK R. PATTERSON & WILLIAM R. 
ANDERSEN, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 558 (4th ed. 2008). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 558-559. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Sokol, supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Malcolm B. Coate – Antitrust Writing Awards 2014, INSTITUTE OF 
COMPETITION LAW ANTITRUST WRITING AWARDS & RANKING 2014, 
awards.concurrences.com/auteur/malcolm-b-coate. 
 38. Sokol, supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 39. Malcolm B. Coate & Shawn W. Ulrick, Transparency at the Federal Trade 
Commission: The Horizontal Merger Review Process, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 531, 531 
(2006). 
 40. Id. at 531-32. 
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mergers.41 The study found that the identity of the controlling party in 
the executive branch did not influence enforcement policy.42 
The study began by looking at the entirety of Hart-Scott-Rodino 
second requests sent by the FTC between 1996 and 2003.43 Hart-Scott-
Rodino is a set of amendments to federal antitrust laws, primarily the 
Clayton Antitrust Act,44 which requires parties to file information and 
receive approval from the FTC or Antitrust Division before they can 
complete mergers. 45  This ensures the merger gets the approval and 
supervision of the government.46 A so-called “second request” occurs 
when the Antitrust Division or FTC believes there may be an 
anticompetitive concern and needs more information from the parties 
merging. 47  The study conducted single-market competitive effects 
analysis and attempted to define the market.48 In its analysis, it included 
factors such as concentration, ease of entry, and specific evidence 
showing anti-competitive concerns.49 Of the 151 horizontal transactions, 
half involved a sole market where competition might be harmed,50 while 
thirty-five transactions involved at least five markets for analysis.51 
The econometric models the study utilized involve binary outcomes 
to determine the relationship between enforcement and the variables that 
might be behind the enforcement.52 The first model discussed is the core 
model, which analyzed a 570-observation sample and was the widest 
data set available.53 It considered the enforcement decision based upon 
structural variables including the HHI,54  the change in the HHI, the 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. at 532. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 533 (excluding those that did not involve horizontal mergers of enough 
substance or those that did not warrant a full investigation). 
 44. FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART-SCOTT-RODINO PREMERGER NOTIFICATION 
PROGRAM: INTRODUCTORY GUIDE III 1 (June 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/guide3.pdf. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Coate & Ulrick, supra note 39, at 533. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 535. 
 53. Id. at 536. 
 54. The HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a measurement of market 
concentration calculated by squaring the market share, expressed in percentage points, 
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number of significant rivals, and industry control variables like those in 
oil, grocery, and chemical industries.55 The remaining models looked at 
were the broad model and the final model.56 The broad model looked 
specifically at those mergers that involved one to three markets. 
However, this model may not provide meaningful results since it was 
impossible to use it to look at how large mergers affect competition in 
many other relevant markets due to the lack of raw data.57 Ultimately, 
the final model was the most useful in analyzing mergers that raised 
only one or two competitive concerns.58 
The relationships of the variables remained stable throughout the 
study, leading Coate and Ulrick to conclude that the political party in 
control of the executive branch was not influential in the outcome of a 
merger investigation.59 
An example of the Antitrust Division’s apolitical approach to 
enforcement60 can be found in the 2011 lawsuit to block the proposed 
merger of AT&T and T-Mobile.61 Andrew Hogley, an Espirito Santo 
Telecoms analyst, opined that the case gained momentum because many 
state governors and attorney generals were vocally supporting the case 
on behalf of the merging companies.62 He hypothesized that the strength 
and pressure of AT&T’s lobbying was gaining traction with the 
Antitrust Division.63 But the Antitrust Division weathered the intense 
lobbying efforts from the merging companies, ultimately deciding that 
                                                                                                                 
of all competing firms in the market and summing these results. Herfindahl-Hirshman 
Index, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
hhi.html. 
 55. Coate & Ulrick, supra note 39, at 536. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 532. 
 60. See Instant View: U.S. Gov’t to Block AT&T Bid for T-Mobile, 19 No. 6 
Westlaw Journal Antitrust 2, Sept. 8, 2011, 2011 WL 3962737 (WJANTI) [hereinafter 
Gov’t Blocks AT&T Bid for T-Mobile] (according to Andrew Schwartzman, Media 
Access Project senior vice president and policy director); Justice Department Files 
Antitrust Lawsuit to Block AT&T’s Acquisition of T-Mobile, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/ 
2011/274615.htm. 
 61. Gov’t Blocks AT&T Bid for T-Mobile, supra note 60, at 2. 
 62. Id. at 1. 
 63. Id. 
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the merger should not go forward because it would be contrary to the 
interests of consumers.64 
C. THE ANTITRUST DIVISION IS OFTEN ONLY WILLING TO SETTLE AN 
ANTITRUST LAWSUIT WHEN IT THINKS THE SETTLEMENT ADDRESSES ITS 
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONCERNS. 
In its complaint, the Antitrust Division stated that a merger would 
create a decreasingly competitive market for legacy airlines because of 
the price gap between legacy airlines and cheaper alternatives.65  “In 
many relevant markets, these [non-legacy] airlines do not offer any 
service at all, and in other markets, many passengers view them as a less 
preferred alternative to the legacy carriers. Therefore, competition from 
Southwest, JetBlue, or other airlines would not be sufficient to prevent 
the anticompetitive consequences of the merger.”66 
The complaint stated that unless the merger was enjoined “(a) 
actual and potential competition between U.S. Airways and American 
Airlines would be eliminated; (b) competition in general among network 
airlines would be lessened substantially; (c) ticket prices and ancillary 
fees would be higher than they otherwise would; (d) industry capacity 
would be lower than it otherwise would; (e) service would be lessened; 
and (f) the availability of slots at Reagan National would be 
significantly impaired.” 67  The nature of this language suggested 
enjoinment was the only option unless the Department’s anticompetitive 
concerns were addressed.68 
II. THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
PROSECUTED ON THE MERITS BECAUSE OF TWO MAJOR CONCERNS: THE 
STAND-ALONE THEORY AND THE ADVANTAGE-PRICING THEORY. 
A. THE STAND-ALONE THEORY 
The stand-alone theory was premised upon the idea that American 
Airlines would be better off post-bankruptcy without the merger because 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. at 2 (according to Andrew Schwartzman, Media Access Project senior vice 
president and policy director). 
 65. Complaint, supra note 25, at 33. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 33-34. 
 68. See id. 
2014]  POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN AIRLINES–U.S.  185 
            AIRWAYS MERGER AND ANTITRUST SETTLEMENT 
of its extensive expansion plan, which a merger would disrupt.69 In fact, 
the Antitrust Division in its initial complaint stated that “[a] US 
Airways’ executive vice president . . . wrote in July 2012 that ‘[t]here is 
NO question about AMR’s ability to survive on a standalone basis.’”70 
Even the media was aware of the options available to American 
Airlines should the merger not survive.71 For example, an opt-out course 
from the merger agreement for American Airlines seemed highly 
appealing.72 The potential reasons for a stand-alone result were varied: 
(1) American’s managers initially feared that the merger would cost 
them their jobs; (2) American’s management would, and could, keep 
working even without the merger; and (3) American was prospering in 
bankruptcy, enjoying its best second quarter in history.73 
With this option at the edge of the table, the Antitrust Division had 
little reason to settle or fail to see its trial through.74 By preserving 
American Airlines as a stand-alone operation, the Antitrust Division 
could preserve the same, if not greater, level of competition than had 
previously existed.75 A settlement that did anything other than resolve 
all of the Antitrust Division’s anti-competitive concerns was less than 
the government needed to accept.76 
B. THE ADVANTAGE-PRICING THEORY 
The Antitrust Division’s advantage-pricing theory was that U.S. 
Airways was a maverick in the airline industry because of its low 
pricing. 77  U.S. Airways executed its pricing model through its 
Advantage Fares program—a strategy that undercut legacy airlines’ 
nonstop service fares by offering less expensive connecting flights.78 
The Advantage Fares program offered a flight with one stop for forty 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Complaint, supra note 25, at 26; Joe Brancatelli, How American Airlines Could 
Bail Out of the US Airways Merger—and Why It Might Want To, JACKSONVILLE BUS. J. 
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/news/news-wire/2013/09/04/ 
will-american-airlines-ditch-usairways.html?page=all. 
 70. Complaint, supra note 25, at 9. 
 71. See Brancatelli, supra note 69. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id.; see Complaint, supra note 25, at 26. 
 75. See Brancatelli, supra note 69. 
 76. See Complaint, supra note 25, at 32-33. 
 77. Complaint, supra note 25, at 4-5. 
 78. Id. 
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percent less than a nonstop flight run by a legacy airline. 79 
Unfortunately, a merger would make the new company less likely to 
keep prices low because even though it would retain U.S. Airways’ 
management, it would now see itself as a “big boy” player in the 
industry that did not need revenue from Advantage Fares’ passengers.80 
U.S. Airways was valuable to consumers because it declined to 
conform to the industry practice of not undercutting the nonstop prices 
offered by legacy competitors.81 Because of U.S. Airways’ Advantage 
Fares program, legacy airlines like American, Delta, and United were 
often driven to offer less expensive fares for connecting service.82 The 
Antitrust Division’s complaint suggested that “Advantage Fares will go 
the way of free baggage check once the merger is complete.”83 
The Antitrust Division supported its theory of harm to consumers 
by showing that U.S. Airways had admitted, as far back as September 
2010, that its Advantage Fares program would change if it had a 
different, perhaps larger, route network.84 The complaint further stated 
that “[i]nternal analysis at American in October 2012 concluded that 
‘[t]he [Advantage Fares] program would have to be eliminated in a 
merger with American, as American’s large non-stop markets would 
now be susceptible to reactionary pricing from Delta and United.’”85 
Meanwhile, the Antitrust Division attempted to pin U.S. Airways 
against the wall by highlighting skepticism that the U.S. Airways’ CEO 
had expressed about other airlines’ commitment to promises made 
during antitrust review when they previously sought merger approval.86 
U.S. Airways’ CEO Doug Parker had stated, “I’m hopeful they’re just 
saying what they need . . . to get this [transaction] approved.”87 The 
complaint then asserted that U.S. Airways and American Airlines were 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Steven Pearlstein, The U.S. Airways–American Airlines Merger is a Go. Here’s 
Why It Maybe Shouldn’t Be, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/11/12/the-u-s-airways-
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doing the same thing: “saying what they believe needs to be said to pass 
antitrust scrutiny.”88 
An example of Doug Parker’s saying whatever was necessary to get 
merger approval was widely disseminated in the press.89 Accordingly, 
the Wall Street Journal reported that Parker, the longest-sitting CEO of a 
U.S.-based airline, had a team that was particularly experienced in 
merger integration.90 The article quoted Parker as saying, “We’ve seen 
what other airlines did . . . . But it’s really difficult work. We’re doing 
everything we can to do it as well as possible and not cause disruption to 
our customers.”91 Parker’s language hedged expectations that the merger 
would not affect services and prices, and it attempted to allay the 
antitrust concerns of the Antitrust Department.92 
III. THERE ARE THREE POTENTIAL REASONS THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 
HAD TO SETTLE THIS LAWSUIT, BUT ONLY THE POLITICAL MOTIVATION 
IS PERSUASIVE. 
A. OPTION 1: A SETTLEMENT WAS THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S STRATEGY 
ALL ALONG. 
It is possible that the Antitrust Division had long planned to settle.93 
Perhaps the harsh language in its complaint against the airlines and the 
public statements of William Baer, Assistant Attorney General for the 
Antitrust Division, were mere puffery in support of an attempt to 
intimidate the parties into settling.94 This is unlikely, however, because 
the Antitrust Division had serious misgivings with the merger due to its 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. 
 89. Biggest Challenges, supra note 8. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Jad Mouwad & Christopher Drew, U.S. in Talks to Settle Suit Over American–
US Airways Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/ 
05/business/us-in-talks-to-settle-suit-over-american-us-airways-merger.html (where the 
article stated that Eric Holder said “the department hoped for a settlement, but remained 
‘fully prepared to take this case to trial’”). 
 94. See Complaint, supra note 25; see Terry Maxon, Justice Official: Here’s Why 
We’re Fighting the US Airways–American Airlines Merger, THE DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS (Aug. 13, 2013), http://aviationblog.dallasnews.com/2013/08/justice-official-
heres-why-were-fighting-the-us-airways-american-airlines-merger.html/ [hereinafter 
Fighting the Merger]. 
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stand-alone and advantage-pricing issues.95  These concerns were not 
mere puffery—they were substantive anti-competitive hazards that the 
Antitrust Division believed would become a reality if the merger went 
forward.96 
In previous lawsuits against proposed mergers, the language in the 
Antitrust Division’s complaint was indicative of whether it was willing 
to settle.97 Comparing the Anheuser-Busch– Grupo Modelo and AT&T–
T-Mobile mergers to the American Airlines–U.S. Airways merger can 
illustrate this intention.98 
In its suit to block the merger of Anheuser-Busch InBev with 
Grupo Modelo, the Antitrust Division’s complaint suggested that the 
parties would probably be able to reach a settlement. 99  While the 
complaint noted a high-low price gap between Anheuser-Busch and 
Modelo similar to the American Airlines and U.S. Airways difference in 
pricing models,100 the language the complaint used in the Anheuser-
Busch–Grupo Modelo complaint suggested a settlement was possible 
through a less forceful tone,101  unlike the language indicators in the 
American Airlines–U.S. Airways complaint. 
The Antitrust Division’s complaint in the Anheuser-Busch–Grupo 
Modelo merger contained weak language regarding remedies. 102  The 
complaint stated that the parties’ suggested remedy was merely 
“inadequate,” but it did not elaborate with stronger language.103 It stated 
that the suggested remedy (selling Grupo Modelo’s interest in Crown 
Imports to another company and entering into supply agreements giving 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Complaint, supra note 25, at 9, 21. 
 96. Competitive Impact Statement at 8, United States v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 
No. 1:13-cv-01236 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2013). 
 97. See Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit Challenging Anheuser-Busch 
InBev’s Proposed Acquisition of Grupo Modelo, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 
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 98. See id. 
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 100. Id.; Complaint, supra note 25, at 4-5. 
 101. Complaint at 20-21, United States v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, No. 1:13-
cv-00127 (D.D.C. Jan. 1, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ 
f292100/292100.pdf. 
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that company the right to import Grupo Modelo beer into the United 
States) “provides no guaranteed protection for consumers that any of its 
terms will be followed if [Anheuser-Busch] is able to secure antitrust 
approval for this acquisition.”104 This suggested that if a guarantee could 
be provided, the potential that Anheuser-Busch would be “able to secure 
antitrust approval” was a distinct possibility.105 
Even analysts expected Anheuser-Busch and the Antitrust Division 
“to reach an accord on reasonable terms.”106 This was in part because 
Anheuser-Busch believed obtaining the rights to Corona and some other 
Grupo Modelo brands through the merger was less significant for the 
company’s growth than maintaining control of Grupo Modelo’s 
operations in other localities.107 
Gina Talamona, a spokeswoman for the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”), was quoted in a newspaper article saying, “As we have said all 
along, any settlement would have to fully protect U.S. consumers by 
preserving the competition that Grupo Modelo currently provides, while 
giving a divestiture buyer the freedom and capability to compete 
vigorously going forward.” 108  Her language indicated the DOJ’s 
openness to settling its suit from the very beginning.109 
The resulting settlement allowed Anheuser-Busch to move forward 
with a $20.1 billion acquisition of Grupo Modelo. 110  The Antitrust 
Division was still able to draw some concessions, including Grupo 
Modelo’s sale of its fifty percent stake in Crown Imports—the company 
responsible for distributing Corona and some Grupo Modelo brands in 
the United States.111 
By contrast, the Antitrust Division stated that its concerns with the 
AT&T–T-Mobile merger could not be resolved, and it was quite 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. at 24. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Michael J. de la Merced, Anheuser-Busch Merger Deal Clears an Antitrust 
Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/20-billion-
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committed to its position. 112  The language in the AT&T–T-Mobile 
complaint was similar to the language used in the American Airlines–
U.S. Airways complaint and public statements from the Antitrust 
Division.113 Sharis Pozen, the acting head of the Antitrust Division at the 
time said, “Any way you look at this merger, it is anticompetitive . . . . It 
raised serious concerns, and we believe it violates the law.”114 
The Antitrust Division in its AT&T–T-Mobile complaint stated that 
it was concerned with the high consolidation of the mobile wireless 
telecommunications services business 115  and the nearly inevitable 
increase in AT&T’s market power following the merger, particularly in 
major metropolitan areas such as Dallas, Houston, Oklahoma City, 
Birmingham, Honolulu, and Seattle.116 The first anticompetitive effect 
the complaint addressed was the possibility that the merger would stifle 
innovation.117 The complaint stated that this anticompetitive effect was a 
possibility because, much like U.S. Airways, T-Mobile was a “faster, 
more agile, and scrappy” competitor who would “find innovative ways 
to overcome scale disadvantages.” 118  The nature of the market also 
increased the chances that this merger would only lead to a more 
consolidated market because of the industry’s “transparent pricing, little 
buyer-side market power, and high barriers to entry and expansion.”119 
According to the Antitrust Division, allowing the merger to be 
consummated would result in higher prices and decreased “quality and 
quantity of services.”120 
Industry commentators resoundingly opined that the strong stance 
of the Antitrust Division indicated that a settlement was unlikely.121 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See David Goldman, DOJ Files Antitrust Suit to Block AT&T Merger with T-
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Thus, Richard Dineen, an HSBC analyst, speculated that “[t]he DOJ’s 
concerns imply that they don’t want less than four big national players. 
There had been speculation that Sprint and T-Mobile may get together, 
but it looks on this basis that even that would be objectionable.”122 
Similarly, the New York Times published that “confidence on AT&T’s 
part seems inexplicable ... For if ever there was a merger likely to be 
blocked on antitrust grounds, this is it.” 123  It quoted Herbert 
Hovenkamp, a professor of law at the University of Iowa and a leader in 
American antitrust law, as saying, “It’s only a slight overstatement to 
say that if they weren’t going to block this one, the Justice Department 
might as well just throw the antitrust guidelines out the window ... This 
merger clearly seems to violate them.”124 
Bert Foer opined in an interview that the Antitrust Division had 
“clearly drawn a line in the sand” against a settlement with AT&T and 
T-Mobile.125 At the time, Foer was the head of the American Antitrust 
Institute in Washington, which opposed the deal.126 
In the American–U.S. Airlines case, Bill Baer said that the two 
airlines were “viable, healthy and in a position to be competitively 
aggressive and successful on a standalone basis.” He also refused to 
concede much ground, stating that “while shareholders might benefit, 
[and] creditors might benefit from consolidation, the fact of the matter is 
that consumers [would] get the shaft.”127  The strong wording of his 
statements suggested that the suit should have followed a pathway more 
akin to that of the AT&T–T-Mobile merger.128 However, it ended up 
adopting a settlement more similar to that of Anheuser-Busch–Grupo 
Modelo merger.129 
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While he vowed that the Antitrust Division would evaluate “each 
merger on its own merit,” the Antitrust Division’s analysis of the U.S. 
Airways and American Airlines merger and antitrust history showed that 
in the Antitrust Division’s “view, looking at the evidence before [it], is 
that the right outcome here (is) a full-stop injunction.”130 
However, three months later, Baer changed his tone and boasted 
that the Antitrust Division believed its case had gotten stronger as the 
parties neared trial, and that the Antitrust Division surmised that the 
merging parties knew this fact.131 Baer cited the “high bar” American 
Airlines and U.S. Airlines had to jump over as one of reasons the parties 
settled, 132  suggesting it was because the airlines feared losing.133  He 
denied that politics played a role in the settlement, calling it a “good 
substantive, pro-competitive result.” 134  Therefore, while the Antitrust 
Division may have said the settlement was good for the economy, its 
180-degree turnabout from Baer’s hard line seems inexplicable and 
unlikely to be part of the Antitrust Division’s long-term strategy.135 
B. OPTION 2: ANOTHER POTENTIAL EXPLANATION FOR PARTIES’ 
SETTLEMENT IS THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S FEAR OF FULLY PURSUING THE 
SUIT. 
By necessity, agencies at times act with consideration to their 
probability of success in particular antitrust cases because a suit’s 
success or failure may affect the agency’s own size and power.136 This 
means that government agencies may consider political implications 
when deciding which cases to pursue since successfully prosecuted 
high-profile cases garner greater rewards for the agency and the 
individual lawyers’ careers.137 It also matters which cases the agencies 
decline to pursue because a loss may affect the agency’s budget 
allocation and staffing quality.138 
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However, the chances the Antitrust Division had for success in this 
case at trial were strong.139 Even though numerous experts and lawyers 
were quoted in the media as saying that the merger was likely to go 
through in spite of the Antitrust Division’s suit,140 many antitrust experts 
also published articles that the government had a strong case and would 
win.141 
Despite the divide between experts’ predictions on the case’s 
outcome, in deciding to settle, Baer was not motivated by a fear of 
losing the case because he was confident in the merits of his position 
and had strong convictions that an injunction was the only viable 
solution.142 His language in the complaint was forceful, stating, “This 
merger positions US Airways’ management to continue the trend (of 
consolidation)—at the expense of consumers.”143 
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The only voices that seemed to believe a settlement was likely 
came from outside the Antitrust Division.144 After the Antitrust Division 
filed its complaint, Reuters reported a U.S. Airways spokesman as 
saying, “The concessions we were willing to offer were designed to 
address competitive concerns that DOJ had raised during the 
investigation. We continue to believe there ought to be a realistic 
possibility of settlement.”145 
Another voice for settlement came from U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 
Sean Lane, who implied he might approve the bankruptcy plan of AMR, 
American Airlines’ parent company, in spite of the Antitrust Division’s 
lawsuit against the cornerstone of the bankruptcy plan: the merger.146 
Baer alleged the Antitrust Division filed the lawsuit because it had 
determined the merger would affect just what § 7 of the Clayton Act 
prohibits by substantially reducing competition in the domestic 
commercial air-travel industry.147 Baer cited the non-necessity of the 
merger for both parties, how the competition between the two airlines 
was essential in keeping prices low for consumers, and the nature of the 
already heavily consolidated airline industry.148 Baer strongly urged that 
the Antitrust Division “simply cannot approve a merger that would 
result in U.S. consumers’ paying higher fares, higher fees and receiving 
less service.”149 He did not mention the possibility of a settlement, but 
instead called the lawsuit “the best possible chance for continued 
competition in an important industry that [consumers] have come to rely 
upon.”150 
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C. OPTION 3: RATHER THAN A LONG-TERM STRATEGY OR A FEEBLE FEAR 
OF LITIGATION FAILURE, POLITICAL FORCES MAY HAVE MORE LIKELY THAN 
NOT BEEN THE DRIVER BEHIND THE SETTLEMENT OF THIS LAWSUIT. 
It may be considered naive to believe antitrust is normally free 
from political considerations; 151  however, this is not naïve—it is 
correct.152 Nevertheless, the combination of the lobbying efforts by the 
parties, the Antitrust Division’s admissions in its competitive impact 
statement following the settlement, and Attorney General Eric Holder’s 
statements apart from the Justice Department suggest politics did play a 
role in the agreement the parties reached in the American Airlines–U.S. 
Airways case.153 Therefore, the merger appears to be an exception to the 
norm of non-partisan antitrust enforcement.154 
1. Lobbying is quite commonplace throughout much of the government’s 
decision-making,155 but what is significant in this settlement is who 
lobbied and with whom the lobbying had traction. 
Lobbying groups are powerful forces in affecting government 
decisions.156 Interest groups save informational costs when they develop 
and advocate for their policy issues because of their economies of 
scale.157 They are also better at mobilizing the public behind legislation 
for which they advocate.158 
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In the case of the American Airlines–U.S. Airways merger, labor 
unions were unusually and strongly in favor of the merger.159 “The two 
main bogeys that an airline needs to worry about during any merger 
integration are labor and technology,” said Hunter Keay, an analyst with 
Wolfe Research.160,161 Oftentimes, gaining the support of labor unions is 
difficult in spite of the strong sense of trust between management and 
union leadership.162 
In the United–Continental Airlines merger, the labor unions did not 
support the merger.163 The Antitrust Division’s case itself against the 
United–Continental merger was somewhat of a surprise because the 
Antitrust Division had not previously voiced major concerns when other 
airlines merged with one another.164 For instance, the Antitrust Division 
did not protest when U.S. Airways and America West Airlines merged 
in 2005, nor did the Antitrust Division speak up in Delta’s 2008 
purchase of Northwest Airlines or the 2011 Southwest Airlines purchase 
of AirTran Airways.165 
Eventually, the key issues with the labor unions came to light, 
showing the public that they did not support the United–Continental 
merger. 166  Pilots were worried about furloughs and seniority, while 
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flight attendants were concerned with contract negotiations.167 Even into 
2013, three years after the 2010 merger of United and Continental, 
employees were still struggling to ratify labor contracts.168 
The unions in the case of American Airlines and U.S. Airways said 
they foresaw better benefits from the merged corporation.169 Unions for 
American Airlines’ three largest sets of employees—its pilots, flight 
attendants, and ground workers—publicly and in court supported the 
merger.170 Based on the agreed terms, the unions would receive roughly 
a quarter of what American Airlines’ creditors would receive in the case 
that the merger went through in the form of shares of the newly merged 
corporation.171 
Another sign that politics played a key role in the American 
Airlines–U.S. Airways settlement is the sort of congressional support 
the American Airlines and U.S. Airways merger received.172 In addition 
to the airline industry’s typical lobby funding from Republican 
candidates,173 the merger also had support from sixty-five Democratic 
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Congressmen and Congresswomen.174 This was unusual, given that pro-
business, Republican-affiliated politicians, and not Democrats, usually 
support non-intervention in business-merger decisions.175 
The letter of Democratic support for the merger was an open 
showing of pressure from Congress on the executive branch to allow the 
merger to proceed.176 The letter, addressed to President Barack Obama, 
stated: 
We believe DOJ’s legal challenge puts at risk the future economic 
security of our constituents, tens-of-thousands of unionized workers 
at both airlines, and the economic well-being of communities that we 
represent… We are concerned that the DOJ’s lawsuit creates an 
atmosphere of uncertainty for our respective congressional districts 
and constituents. While we share your concern regarding any 
potential impact on consumers as consolidation in any industry is 
contemplated, we believe that DOJ’s concerns as outlined in the 
complaint filed last month are not an adequate representation of all 
of the facts.177 
This unique combination of union and Democratic Congressional 
support made it highly probable that politics played at least some role in 
the decision to allow the merger to move forward in a settlement.178 
2. The competitive impact statement stated that the settlement failed to 
resolve the Antitrust Division’s concerns with the stand-alone and 
advantage pricing theories, making the settlement highly unusual. 
While the settlement would go on to please the labor unions, 
AMR’s creditors, and the management of both American Airlines and 
U.S. Airways, the Antitrust Division’s Competitive Impact Statement of 
the settlement stated that it does “not create a new independent 
competitor, nor does it purport to replicate American’s capacity 
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expansion plans or create Advantage Fares where they might otherwise 
be eliminated.”179 
Instead, the merger leaves a heavily consolidated airline industry 
with only three legacy carriers with large domestic and international 
flight networks that can offer well-known brands and frequent-flyer 
programs.180 Smaller networks will still exist, which can offer lower-fare 
options,181 but the newly merged airline would be considered by antitrust 
regulators and consumers to be one of the three legacy airlines.182 This 
merger eliminated one of consumer’s low-cost options, a role which 
U.S. Airways had played forcefully through its Advantage Fares 
program.183 
The merger settlement attempts to address the feared harms from an 
amplified presence at some airports and wider anticompetitive harms by 
requiring “the divestiture of an unprecedented quantity of valuable 
facilities at seven of the most important airports in the United States.”184 
The Competitive Impact Statement also discusses alternatives to the 
settlement, which included a trial on the merits against American 
Airlines and U.S. Airways. 185  The Antitrust Division’s Competitive 
Impact Statement predicted the settlement would save the government 
time, money, and the uncertainty of trial,186 but did not elaborate on the 
alleged uncertainty or give a quantitative measure for how unsure it was 
of success at trial, had it gone forward.187 
3. Attorney General Eric Holder made a statement that was out of step 
and not in conjunction with the Antitrust Division, stating that the suit 
could likely be settled depending on what concessions were reached. 
On November 4, 2013, while U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder 
conferred with the press regarding another issue, he made a detour in his 
statements to address the American Airlines–U.S. Airways merger 
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suit. 188  He said the discussions were “ongoing,” and that the DOJ 
“hope[s] to be able to resolve this short of trial.”189 
When the press asked him if the government wanted to ensure that 
a potential settlement would be required to include a divestiture of slots 
at major airports like Ronald Reagan National, Holder agreed and said 
the focus was “to make sure that any resolution in this case necessarily 
included divestitures of facilities at key constrained airports throughout 
the United States. That, for us, is something that has to be a part of—of 
any resolution.”190 
This language differs from the previous statements of Baer on 
behalf of the Antitrust Division,191  and suggests that something else 
(perhaps political concerns) influenced the DOJ and what actually 
resulted: a settlement that avoided trial, did not solve any of the 
Antitrust Division’s key concerns with the merger’s anticompetitive 
effects, and only included minor divestitures of slots at particular 
airports of concern.192 
CONCLUSION 
Oftentimes, interest groups like airline lobbyists are seen as selfish 
because they seek their own economic interests at the expense of the 
constituents that legislators are elected to represent. 193  Similarly, a 
skeptical public perceives legislators as serving their own re-election 
and personal motivations.194 Interest groups and legislators can rebrand 
their efforts as “progress,” but regardless of the characterization, in 
some unique instances it appears that politics can influence antitrust law 
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enforcement to the detriment of average consumers.195 In the case of the 
American Airlines and U.S. Airways merger, it seems that many other 
factors could have explained the settlement. 196  President Barack 
Obama’s administration vowed in 2009 to return to more aggressive 
enforcement of antitrust laws after the Bush administration treated 
defendant corporations far too leniently.197 The Obama administration’s 
toughened antitrust enforcement 198  makes the possibility that politics 
influenced the decision to settle this particular antitrust merger suit—as 
opposed to taking it to trial—seem all the more likely. 
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